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Theatres of the Book:
Covering, Flaunting, Marketing,
Author and Text
Peter Goodrich1
What was required of me was the skill to play my role and not
compromise myself (Seignalt 1797/1978: vol 3 108).

The printing of theatre — theatrum imprimatur, just to flaunt a little —
was accompanied by a theatricalisation of print. The new technology
of the production of books brought with it not only an exponentially
greater quantity, but also an increased visibility, of scholarly works and
religious and legal texts particularly. Pamphlets, typescripts, books
flooded the markets and were everywhere on view. Early print also
had a striking dimension of performance and play. Aviaries of angels
and other devotional and instructional figures adorned the religious
manuals and modelled the proper persona, the ontic self, that the subject
should play. Early law texts had coloured graphics, emblems, ‘devises’,
as well as schemata, charts, portraits and mottos. Legal being too had
its visible and printed figures, the image of the apposite propositus
that accompanied the ceremonies of the norm and their demands for
honour and role. The lectoral ‘contentment of sight’ made the book
into a species of theatre, and law itself had its tradition of drama, as
also of justice, both seen and unseeing. To these relatively well known
dimensions of visibility and theatricality I will here add a footnote
concerning the book as cover and covering, as expression and occlusion
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of the drama of the juristic self. My specific topic and illustration will
be the cover of a singular book on Covering by the lawyer poet Kenji
Yoshino (2006). The analysis offered will address the jacket picture(s),
title and blurbs, the cover viewed as text become figure and thus as the
first and emblematic image — in filmic terms the opening credits —
which catch the eye, attract or repel, but seldom gain the analysis that
such crucial clothing, such flagrant flaunting, merits.

Covers
Interestingly enough, the cover is a relatively recent phenomenon.
Historically books were bound, frequently by the purchaser, in vellum
and then board. Originally likely to be wrapped in lawyer’s whethers
(sheepskin), and sometimes pigskin, they were later most often simply
encased between plain panels. There might be some pattern engraved
along the edges of the leather or stamped in the centre of the board,
larger books would have metal clasps or leather ties, but from the
Gutenberg Bible to the earliest legal incunabula, from Shakespeare’s
various folio editions to Blackstone’s Commentaries, the colours and
curlicues, images, emblems and other illuminations were kept for the
inside of the work. The earliest cover in the modern sense of the dust
jacket or exterior image dates to 1825 and was used for the collected
works of Voltaire, or so we are informed by Gerard Genette in his
curious study of Paratexts, meaning the marginalia of publication
(Genette 2004: 22-4). The ‘blank leather’ of the classical binding
gave way in the nineteenth century to a plethora of printed covers
which included anything from the author’s signature to their portrait,
dedications, mottos, emblems, title, subtitles, names, numbers, date
and price (Genette 2004: 24).
The cover then is one feature of the marginalia of book production,
one of the miscellaneous thresholds to publication and, although it is
not generally remarked in scholarly discourse, it does form a genre of
sorts, a body of statements both visual and graphic that have their own
rhetoric and significance. The cover in fact replaced the frontispiece
image which in early printed texts was most often some species of
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emblem or heraldic device on the opening page. The title page would
often be in part in coloured ink, with multiple typefaces, and Latin
mottos. Thus the 1610 edition of John Selden’s Jani Anglorum facies
altera has an image of the juridical deity Janus (a two-faced figure)
with a Latin motto on the title page (Selden 1610). 2 It is a significant
emblem of the work and, although it might seem an incidental
feature, accurately depicts, in image and motto, the radical character
of the book. Jani Anglorum is an account of the feminine sources of
common law, a work that uncovers hidden dimensions of Anglican
law’s interior and affective roots in a gynococratic past and in Druidic
rites and communities. The image that acts as the face of the tract also
implies the importance of the image as face. It is the frontispiece and
so it is the first sign, a flaunting which announces the visible themes
of the book which it fronts. The cover plays a comparable but more
ambivalent role in that the mystery of the frontispiece, of the emblem
veiled by boards, hidden inside the bindings, protected by fascia is
now demoted and placed outside as a disposable and sometimes
dispensable image, a mere cover. 3

The most famous example of the frontispiece engraving, however, is
the emblem of Leviathan at the opening of Thomas Hobbes’ eponymous
treatise (1651). The image is that of the crowned sovereign, sword in one
hand, staff in the other, looming over a landscape, in the foreground of
which are a cathedral and a city. In the printed edition, the sovereign’s
torso, except for the hands, as is well known, is composed entirely of
his subjects, all turned away from the viewer and obediently looking
towards the sovereign’s face. Many are kneeling. The image is both
striking and somewhat opaque. The sovereign rises up and dominates
the landscape, his body populous and vast, whereas the kingdom, the
realm surveyed, consists only of neatly placed villages, prominent
churches and then, at the front, the well-ordered, indeed thoroughly
regimented, geometrically proportioned city. The significant point,
visually, is that there are only buildings: the landscape and walled,
castellated city are strikingly empty of people. Deserted. Blank.4 For
the author of the image, humanity is definitively elsewhere. The people
are not even on the ground but rather swept up, aloft, in the air, as
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the constituent parts and members of the sovereign body, Behemoth,
Juggernaut and, here, Leviathan. It is a powerful and lasting image of
sovereignty as governance that stands over us, watches and threatens an
absolute judgment. The sovereign is the embodiment of law, the corpus
iuris, father and judge, guide and arbiter of the social. Indeed much
more can be said about this emblematic image, but it will have to wait.

The significance of Hobbes’ frontispiece is initially to be found
in its theoretical insignificance. It is, relatively speaking, a popular
emblem but it has not gained much in the way of jurisprudential or
substantive doctrinal elaboration. It is mentioned, it may even be
viewed as aesthetically interesting, but it is not treatise, norm, polity
or law. To this we can add that it is also and frequently now used,
in whole or more usually in part, as the cover or dust flap image of
contemporary editions of Leviathan (Hobbes 1978 edn).5 Here is an
oddity or visual bagatelle that may help publishers sell the work and so
it makes the passage, quite literally from interior to exterior, from title
page to dust jacket, from frontispiece of the work to disposable cover
or, in the case of a paperback, to the incidental marking of the soft
jacket. Here though, and already, we can note the other significance
of this passage and trajectory. The movement of the image, and of the
iconographic message it portrays, from title page to cover already marks
an exteriorisation of the interior, a ‘coming out’ as it were, that fits well
with the dual thematic of covering as both exposing and concealing,
adorning and draping.
It is maybe because the shift from the interior image to the outside
cover seems obvious, a merely technological achievement, that it gains
little recognition. The interior image is somehow treated as if it is
dismissed to the cover, and so expressly moved out of the work. It is
somehow too trivial to be remarked, too evident to be addressed directly,
too marginal to be taken seriously. And so it is already something of a
lost genre. If I analyse it here, it is in part for fear that the image on the
dust jacket gets lost in the passage to the library and the processing that
leads to the shelving of books according to one or other of the numerical
systems of classification that archivists use and electronic filing mimics.6
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There is a start, an effort of preservation that counters the discarding of
the dust jacket in the public repositories of books, presumably because
the cover is simply a cover, a protection, a way of fending off external
threats to the integrity of the text, which is now safely embedded and
likely vegetating in the stacks. The cover, in this dismissive modern
interpretation, is simply part of the detritus of publicity, a symptom
of advertising, a piece of trivia to be discarded like wrapping paper in
favour of the seriousness of the gift and missive within. Something
like that, but this general and not particularly conscious discounting
of the cover image is deeply ironic if one recalls that the cover image
is in fact an interior image that has been placed on the exterior, the
first or original sign of the inside moved inadvertently and precariously
to the outside. It is an emblem of the work, its face, its effigy and so
in many respects its exemplary sign, and yet it is a sign that ironically
gets mislaid, discarded or itself concealed.
To this can be added that covering itself suggests something
obscured, the intrusive rather than the obtrusive or as Robert Burton
has it in the Preface to the Anatomy of Melancholy: ‘when you see the
cover, why ask about the thing hidden? It was covered, because he
should not know what was in it’ (Burton 1628: 11). Here we can revert
to the first of the historical significances of covering, a root meaning
according to which it is a corpse that is covered with a mantle (corpus
pallio), and in our case the corpus is the work, what Walter Benjamin
appropriately enough viewed as being itself the death mask of its
author’s intention. The cover is occlusive. It shrouds and veils. It is
a mantle and serves primarily to cloak. And not in the swaddling
clothes of nascence but in the wrapping of the desiccated body.
Indeed, in Egyptian practices of mummification, preservation of the
soul through careful embalming of the body was not completed until
the corpse was wrapped elaborately in linen. We inherit this sense of
a link between covering and mortification in the specifically juridical
concept of the permanence of the legal text, in its addressing not the
contemporary but posterity. Law lives on through its unchanging black
letters, fixed in Gothic script, collected in gargantuan folds, covered
and embalmed in the library. The plea rolls and the tables of fines, the
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cases and other books of the law, collectively still termed the corpus
iuris, make reference, if suitably veiled, to a body, a corpse and hence
also something shrouded, covered, mute and awaiting resurrection.
Lex est mutus magistratus we are told by the early lawyers, it is a silent
judge, it is inanimate, without breath, a dead letter until it finds its
tongue, its poet, its majesty. This, of course, is where the poet lawyer,
historically speaking the gay scientist, Professor Yoshino and his recent
enough work on Covering reluctantly enters the stage.7

Covering

Figure 1 The front cover of Kenji Yoshino’s Covering: The Hidden Assault
on Our Civil Rights. Copyright © 2006 by Random House Inc. Used by
permission of Random House Limited.

Start with the cover of Covering. A simple nominal choice not only
because books uncover, which is to say they provide a space to unleash
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in a displaced form a self that likely cannot appear in everyday speech,
but also because they have a cover. So if we turn, and why not play
the literalist for a moment, to the cover of Covering, the inside on
the outside, we can immediately note the sepulchral half tones, the
monochrome of the image. [See Figure 1.] The front cover picture
is in the form of a black and white photograph in which half of the
author’s face is shown in a sepia style portrait, folding out of the cover,
while the rest is blank, bare tablet, a palimpsest grey — fusion of black
and white, paper and text. Over this ambiguous space the title of the
book is printed in lower case letters in lavender. The subtitle is in white
lettering, small caps. The author’s name is in mellow yellow, mainly
lower case, pacific rim. If we spare the modern commercial publisher
the aspersion of too great a degree of subtlety, the grey on grey is the
Hegelian mark of indefinition, of things hidden, of identity covered
or obscured, shadow at dusk. In the heraldic law of colour, suitably
updated, the lavender is an ironic index of invention, the purple thread
of sovereignty or emendation of law to which the gay identity that is
covered by the word ‘covering’ undoubtedly refers. And the yellow is
the mark of the orient, of the sensei or teacher. To this, another initial
indicator of the image can be added, namely that the letters and the
colours cover the figure, the face of the author himself. His visage is
partially obscured, driven into the background by the lettering — the
branding one might reasonably opine — by the purple prose, by the
assault on law to which the subtitle refers. The cover as shroud upon
a corpse gives way to the mantle or cloak of the traveller, of the being
that subsists and moves behind the cover. This is Milton’s mantle from
the last line of Lycidas (Milton 1891: 74):
At last he rose, and twitch’d his mantle blue:
To-morrow to fresh woods and pastures new.

The mantle blue, in this case a lavender blue, both signifies and hides
a melancholic body, a covered soul. The melancholia of law has to be
twitched and moved along. The work of which this is the title page,
the cover, may be marked initially by a certain quietude, soft tones,
and a partial invisibility or at least obscurity that accurately reflects
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the narrative in the pages ahead where colour will dawn and law will
be rewritten slowly yet in a more diverse hue.

Recto and verso, front cover and reverse cover. And so, moving
on, consider first, recto, oratio recto, direct speech, frontal visage, the
shroud. The background, the non-verbal is what is both torn and
hidden, but look closer, look behind the text and there is a stylised
effigy or imprint of the mask, the legal body, the persona or face. Not
any face and not a whole face. Half a face and if, as lawyers have long
dictated, the face is the mirror of the soul, vultus est index animi, then
this is a split visage, an image rent in two (Head 1656: 53).8 One eye,
one nostril, one ear, one corner of the mouth, one cheek all suggest
what used to be termed a broken face. It is a collapsed face, one that
has lost its form, it is colourless and, by extension, covered or veiled.
It is classically a feminine face and signals at first viewing a downcast,
obedient, reverent image, one that does not look directly into the eye of
the auditor, judge or reader. It is a face that does not confront authority,
one which neither attracts nor incites desire. But the half face on the
cover is not looking with downcast eyes.

The paradox of this effaced face is caught in the placement of the
‘g’ of ‘covering’ directly over the eye, as if a monocle or, less poetically,
half of a spectacle through which the eye stares out. The spectacle is
perhaps too obviously the ‘g’ of gayness, the subject here staring with
one eye through the partial lens of sexual orientation. So too it is a
pirate’s gaze — fixed, defiant almost — smiling out. The top half of
the ‘g’ in minion (mignon) typeface forms a circle with a suitably bent
curlicue extending from the top right corner. The sign of masculinity
but with the arrow of virility shortened, softened, in lavender and
literally bent. To this, note finally the more antique visual archive
to which this image perhaps inadvertently refers: the emblem of the
Anglican Church — the sign of its constitution and presence was an
eye enclosed in a triangular or even pyramidal shape. That image of
Anglican foundation, which was also highly controversial at the time
of its original inscription, when greater attention was paid to images,
is taken up and reformulated here as a partial image of a homosexual
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constitution. The eye staring out of the ‘g’ is a symbol of a different
masculinity, a lavender virility, a taking back of civic space.

Figure 2 The back outside cover of Kenji Yoshino’s Covering: The Hidden
Assault on Our Civil Rights. Copyright © 2006 by Random House Inc. Used
by permission of Random House Limited.

The image is of a partial concealment, it covers but is also a moment
of reverse covering, of coming out. Indeed, turn to the reverse cover, the
back-face of this Janus and the most immediately noticeable feature is
that the face, the other half of the image from the front cover, is here
tilted forward, more positive and persuasive, pressing to come out of the
background and announce itself. Again, however, we must note that the
face is covered. There are words printed over the image, but here they
are snippets of laudation, ‘advance praise for covering’ [See Figure 2].
Praise of something before covering perhaps? Maybe advanced praise
— high calibre, well educated laudation — the hyperbole of hierophants
pasted to the back leaf. Hype. Encomia. White on grey. And final
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irony, it suggests that covering should be praised, that we should flaunt
it and, in flaunting we affirm, so much so that we could almost expect
the opus to be a latter-day version of Fortescue’s foundational fifteenth
century treatise In Praise of the Laws of England, adapted now — same
tradition but new object of veneration — to the title De Laudibus legum
tegumentae — In Praise of the Laws of Covering (Fortescue circa 1463).

It is unusual, I know and will say it again, to take the cover
seriously. It is browsed, not read. But keep going. What precisely do the
encomiasts have to say? What about the book is to be flaunted? Whose
choice these blurbs on the back cover? Perhaps a brief conspectus,
for the shame and the delight of it. First off, Adam Haslett says that
‘Covering quite literally brings the law to life’. No covering, no law. So
here, or so at least we may suspect, the life of the law is covering, not
the ars moriendi or art of shrouding, of dying, but rather the rhetorical
and highly figurative art of lawyering. So covering is necessary for law,
indeed brings it to life, because without the theatre of covering, the life
giving social art of playing the role of the lawyer, there would be no law.
Lex animata or living law is only made possible by covering. There is
a baroque coinage for this, theatrum veritatis et iustitiae, the theatre of
justice and truth, and that is what Haslett offers as his advance praise
following in an earlier if unknown juristic tradition (Baptista 1685).
Which is at least curious because it makes covering sound essential and
desirable. It is a good thing, we have no choice but to cover. Covering
gives life to law and yet, for Yoshino, covering — as we know from
the subtitle — is apparently a hidden assault on our civil rights, a bad
thing, both painful and epistemically obstructive. Did Haslett get it
wrong? Did he mean to? My suspicion is that Adam the novelist, and
former classmate of Yoshino’s, and for sure I shouldn’t be mentioning
such things, aimed at a productive misunderstanding of the lawyer. I
suspect, worse still, that the novelist played the part of the lawyer and
inadvertently suggested that Yoshino’s experience at law school was
precisely the cost of admission, the price of bringing the law to life.
They were at Yale together. Note further the title of Haslett’s book,
cited on the back cover: You Are Not a Stranger Here. Grant that the
citation gives the title a significance for Yoshino and for Covering and
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we can conclude that Haslett is both praising Covering and noting in
good novelistic style that covering, the art of creating fictional identities,
is intrinsic to law, to the professions, and to the theatre of public life.
That Yoshino is not a stranger here, indeed that he was Academic Dean
at Yale Law School, the No.1 ranked legal academy in the US at the
time of the book’s publication, suggests that he is neither a stranger,
in alienam iuris as we say, nor an outsider, but rather a similar and sui
iuris as in his own law. Otherwise, why suffer? Go be a professor of
literature, a poet, a radical.

Then there is Koh. The first lawyer and last man offering advance
praise. He is the only blurber identified exclusively by institutional
affiliations rather than books written. Dean Koh, Kenji’s Dean,
states with appropriate terseness that the book ‘should explode into
America’s consciousness’. True it is tense and tautly written, precious
prose, but I read it as softer and more melancholic than an explosion.
In fact I suspect that the opposite is likely the case. Covering is not so
much explosive, perhaps as Koh says it should be, but it is more gentle
and insinuating than inflammatory or combustible. It offers tears not
tinder, and more of a keg than a fuse. The question it poses at this
point, in opposition to Koh’s normative ‘should’, is how to give it effect,
short-term and longue durée. How is the intimate public sphere, the
interior of the institution, to be made existentially safe, congenial and
accessible to the aesthetics of gay identity, to the flaunting of alternate
and plural aesthetic tastes and quotidian erotic self-expressions? What
is needed is a significant change in the conversation, a shift to greater
eloquence, to affective candour in the variegated existential spaces
of collegial interaction, career survival, institutional advancement,
in sum public decision-making great and small. The answer, at this
point in the institutional history of law, is wrapped up in the question
of covering itself.

The term implies a mixing of genres, the confluence of law and
literature, the enfolding of autobiography and jurisprudence, poetry
and rule, erotic and normative. There is as yet little eros in nomos, no
erudition in eroticis in contemporary schools of legal theory, short
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change for libido in the market economics of law (Nietzsche 1916: 53).9
That said, Yoshino is implicitly committed to rectifying the imbalance
in conjoining the literary and the legal, poetry and law. The poets too
should be legislators, and in his view there is room to treat biography
as the equal of doctrine and, hence, to allow a degree of reversion to
the older meaning of gay science and its amatory law (Goodrich 2006).
In that context, in the era of the fourteenth century revival of the
troubadour tradition, the laws of love were the rhetorical rules of poetic
composition and the best orators were picked as members of the Gay
Consistory and as the judges of poetic tournaments (Goodrich 2003).
The gay lawyer, to cite Rabelais, was sans culottes, a bare assed advocate,
a viscerally learned figure (Rabelais 1696: 34). All of which is to say
that autobiography opens up a novel space and arguably a more honest
form of dialogue as to the demands that are made for conformity and
covering. To the extent that autobiography is the enactment of the self,
the emergence of ‘voice’, the actor taking to the stage, the very fact of
inscribing experience — both trauma and desire — in a juridical text,
simultaneously challenges the demand to cover and the conventional
boundaries of legal method. It is a form of being bad, catachresis, a
solecism that becomes a way of saying something new.

Such is the cover in terms of what Genette terms publishing
thresholds. Front and back. Two sides of the face. Silent and voluble,
image and text, the covered and the flaunted. What is there left to be
said? Isn’t the topic of covering now covered by advance figures giving
advanced praise? Time to drop the book and go out and do something
about covering, blow the whistle, write the brief, call the lobbyist,
contribute to the campaign fund, protest, rally, and rail against the
exclusion of the light. But not quite so fast. Note if you will that pride of
place in the flaunted encomia on the verso cover goes not to an academic,
not to a law school dean, but to someone who is known principally as a
novelist, even if he is undoubtedly teaching creative writing, the craft of
fiction, literary self-organization, flower poetry or something similar at
a college – Columbia University last I looked – to help pass the line. The
figure of literature (and of the lex amicitia that comes with it) precedes
the intonations of the scholarly, of the political and the legal. Pride of
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place goes to questions of aesthetic discrimination, imagination and, by
extension, the possibilities of alternative conversational styles, dialogue
in different forms. To pursue this point of priority, to stick to the spirit
if not the letter, the image and not simply the word of the cover, I will
offer three additional commentaries, a triad of further connotations of
covering and flaunting, a minor trinity, another scene.

Theatre and Flaunting
First, the dimensions of the issue. Yoshino is clear that we all cover. On
the inside flap of the recto cover, in lavender letters, this ‘remarkable
and elegant work’ which ‘fuses legal manifesto and poetic memoir’
begins its self-description with two words: ‘Everyone covers’. They
hide disfavoured traits. Even angry straight white men have to cover
(Yoshino 2006: 24). I cover. You cover. To this I will propose an
additional and complementary thesis, an extension of the hypothesis,
namely that all covering is erotic. This is especially so in common law
terms. The word to cover comes from the Law French covert, meaning
in a veiled or guarded manner, and refers legally to a femme covert, a
married and so veiled woman. She loses her name, her capacity and
personality. Her body becomes the usufruct of another, if I can put it
like that, and who is going to stop me? Upon marriage, the husband
covers the woman, but I am getting carried away. The doctrinal point
is that she loses her law and is transferred in alienam familiam. She
becomes the child of another. Why so covered? Why the veil? Why the
lack of status that it signifies? According to Juan Luis Vives’s (1523) On
the Instruction of Christian Women, the veil is the mark of ‘shamefastnes’,
and this covering of the face signifies virtue and specifically chastity,
‘in so much that she can not be chaste, that is not ashamed: for that is
as a cover and a vayle of her face’ (Vives 1557: fol K i a). This text could
be taken in many competing directions. For present purposes, the face
is an image and images – and in that era of reformation and recusancy,
with something of a vengeance -- incite desire. To veil the face is to
cover the image and so mask desire. It is kept for the husband, for the
man of whom the woman, the image, is a member. The covered face
369
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signals purity and the counterposition of shame to love. What is for
Christian doctrine shameful — the body, carnal lust, human desire — is
veiled in favour of a purer passion, a spiritual love. The idol of the face,
and the carnality it implies, is covered so as to hide the other scene of
love, the body and its sexual functions.
Vives himself, as author of an instructional manual on early
Christian forms of literal covering of the face and of desire, draws
upon a much older patristic tradition. The most interesting and direct
text expounding the Christian demand for covering is undoubtedly
Tertullian On the Veiling of Virgins (1870). He argues that the face of
the virgin threatens to fascinate, to magnetise, to lure to sin and for
this reason she must veil it so as to block the pathway to temptation
‘for who will have the audacity to intrude with eyes upon a shrouded
face? A face without feeling? A face, so to say, morose?’ It is the last
phrase that is most directly relevant because it invokes a law of erotic
melancholy, a nomos of visceral sorrow, a gesture of corporeal erasure.
That is the subject of covering, and while it maybe marks the wound
that generates desire, I would like to think of it as a symptom, it gives
expression to a melancholia that needs release, that must be properly
mourned.

The law of the morose face, of erotic melancholy is the code for
entry of the body into the social, it marks the rituals that accompany
desire and at its best — as the law of love, and of amity — it addresses
the space of erotic erudition, the discourse upon how we come to
know and, over time to, love. To cover in this original common law
meaning is to marry and by extension to join, to take up a place and
role within a genealogy and family. For the femme covert this meant
losing her identity, her name and, historically at least, her free will.
She became subject to another. Those connotations are not entirely
alien to Yoshino’s sense of taking up his place, his institutional role
and pedagogic function in Law School. It is to that biographical path
into the institution of law, together with the accompanying sense of
existential loss of will and hiding of body and desire, that he devotes
the better part of Covering.

370

Theatres of the Book

Here then, in law school, in its affective and often wounded spaces
of reproduction, the successful student learns to become a master, to
take on a mask, to play a role, to perform an identity that initially at
least will likely seem to belong to another. For Yoshino, conscious
of his own vulnerability, desperate to succeed, keen to pass largely
unnoticed, the process involved trauma and attachment, covering and
object choice. Thus, notable amongst adaptive techniques mentioned
early in the narrative, he engages with a favourite professor’s text:
I also took to sleeping with his book. I would read it before falling
asleep each night, and settle with my arms around it. In this time when
everything was changing, this text would not change. The print would
stay fixed on the pages, the words would say tomorrow what they said
today (Yoshino 2006: 14).

The legal text reverts to the antique meaning of text as skin, as
entanglement, both terror and desire. The black letters became an
anchor, an object of love, a figure of authority, Pythagoras or here
Bill Rubenstein, possessed through his words, undressed through
his book.10 In embracing the text Yoshino provides an interesting
and unwitting answer to the question posed by the psychoanalytic
jurist Pierre Legendre: ‘How does one cleave to the text, how does
adhesion to the truth of a text occur, and by what subtle artifice can
one amorously enjoy a text?’11 By taking it under the covers, through a
sensuous apprehension of object and content, image and word.

The anecdote provides one of many instances of eros and pain
thrown together, here in a part object, a synecdoche for the figure of
a jurist that the youthful Yoshino hoped to become. Richard de Bury
opines that ‘it is altogether befitting the decency of a scholar, that
washing should without fail precede reading’, and here the purification
of sleep, the constancy of the letter, binds subject to book in an amorous
way, through the attachment mode of object choice. It is a key moment,
especially if one allows that, again according to de Bury, ‘the master
love of books’ does not apply to legal texts: ‘an appetite for the books of
civilians took little hold of our affections’.12 The law book is in general
‘like the scorpion in treacle’, and so not a fit bedfellow unless the treatise
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is exceptional, and contains something more than law, a plus ultra or
amicable purpose, in short a humanism beyond the limited measure
of secular rules and human will.

In falling in love with a law book, the neophyte lawyer exposes
both a wound and a longing that are more usually the stuff, as Yoshino
constantly affirms, of poetry and literature. The jurist’s bibliophilia
is transitional and marks in the most dramatic of forms a symbolic
permutation, by which I mean an unconscious scene of capture by law.
The image of a literal bibliophilia offers at the very least a compelling
figure of the paradox of juristic initiation, of coming to desire a wisdom
that is supposedly without desire. Here, specifically, we witness a
passion that is thrice covered. It is covered by night, hidden by the
bedcovers, and then secreted again between the sheets, between the
boards and the reams of the casebook. In this image of dormant book
and dreaming reader, we can glimpse a passage through the maelstrom
of law school and the painful rites of initiation into the sect. This was
the point of entry, the visceral encounter with the institution, and there
has to be a fissure, a fault, a line of flight, a yoke through which each
of us passes in coming to terms with law.
For Yoshino — gay and Japanese-American, poetically inclined,
reticent, uncertain of identity and place — law school, as a student
and as a professor, was an unwilling askesis, a harsh displacement, a
painful demand. To go to law school, to join the sect, he had to hide
in the dark, to sleep with a book, to attend classes covertly, and then
to cover, meaning not to flaunt his identity, not enact his persona too
visibly or speak his name too loudly. ‘You’ll have a better chance of
tenure’, a colleague cautioned him in an off-hour and in a thoroughly
Foucaultian fashion, ‘if you’re a homosexual professional than if you’re
a professional homosexual’ (Yoshino 2006: 17). In other words, flaunt
what you are not, cover who you are. The injunction repeats an antique
maxim of legal covering that can be culled from Sir Edward Coke: in
hominis vitium non professionis, it is never the law that fails but only men
(Coke 1777: A6r-v). Against this curious effacement can be counterposed an even more venerable lex amatoria, of which Coke was also
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aware. It would challenge the maxim as anachronistic and misplaced,
as too narrow because it is not in the end lex but rather veritas that is
to be loved and for this, the poets, auctoritates poetarum, are the final
adjudicators and, in the Greek, nomikoi. It is this fissure or point of
historical separation that Yoshino traverses and explores.

Covering wields the poets and introduces the lex amatoria to the
questions of erotic attachment and aesthetic practice that modern law
has refused to acknowledge and address. Kenji mixes eros and law,
enfolds poetry and norm. He does so in the form of making the case for
a civil right, I would say a right to civility, in matters of love, or more
precisely in all interactions in the intimate public sphere, in the affective
space where we act out our institutional lives. It is in his terms a right
to flaunt, meaning simply a liberty, freedom to escape the instituted
mask, the imposed visage, and so to enact another self. It is a version,
I think, of what the French feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray terms
an objective right to subjectivity and she argues that as there are two
sexes so there should be two aesthetic public spheres, and half of the
space of representation should belong to women (Irigaray 1996). For
Irigaray the primary legal issue was that of giving objective recognition
to subjective, and so historically feminine, expressions of creed, taste,
myth, desire, knowledge and relationship.13 Now Kenji suggests a cross
cutting but not intrinsically conflicting principle, that of an intimate
public sphere which suffuses all institutional and political spaces and
is open to the acting out of whatever erotic identities, sexual personae
or everyday affective selves subjectivity can invent and invest. What
was covered should be flaunted.

Adam Phillips (1996) points out that we only flirt with serious
things — with death, disaster, love, for example — but he makes no
mention of flaunting. If flirting is a mode of approach and inextricably
ostensive — I flirt to you, flaunting is existential and habitative. In
phenomenological terms, to flaunt is to nest in the world, to make
a place, find a tone, fiat iustitia et pereat mundus as we used to say.
Whatever its mode, it signals a relation to one’s own being. Flirting is
epistemological, flaunting is ontological. It is the mode of taking up a
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social presence, inhabiting a role, an institution, a fate. To flaunt is to
stage the self, to devise the person, to become an emblem, to demand
a treatment of one’s own invention, to risk an autonomous authorship
of how one plays one’s role. No one, to borrow from the Lacanians,
escapes the institution. That is who we are. Our public selves. The self
enshrined in the intimate theatre of the public sphere.

Thankfully, the drama of existence displaces law. We deal here
not with law but with the primary appropriations of identity, name
and persona, which the Greeks talk of in terms of nomos and which
include naming, rhythm, poetry, narrative, image and the politics
of representation as such. Before law, nomos was the discourse of
the nomikoi, non-lawyers, the bards, the seers, the artists, poets and
musicians (Crook 1995: 154-8). That is true historically and it is also
true conceptually. There are better ways of talking, of relating, than
through court and lawsuits. Kenji reminds us that common law, the
ipse dixit of judge and jurist, the dreams and fuits of sergeants-at-law,
are of limited interest when it is not a fee simple – a religious rite
-- but a flaunting – an erotic undertaking -- that is at issue. There is
something of a paradox here, in that Yoshino doesn’t fully abandon
the religious rites and languages of law. He still wants to talk about
civil rights and egregious cases, the non-poetic but that discussion, and
this is the signal achievement of Yoshino’s Covering, namely that he
drifts beyond the antagonism, desiccation and thorough incompetence
of juristic attempts to address affective and erotic interactions. They
will never get us very far and that is why the book is addressed beyond
the legal academy, beyond the academic audience and engages a much
more diverse set of disciplines. Kenji carves out a public intellectual
sphere, a positive and yet precarious space of intimate dialogue within
the margins of the academy and the border of the market forces that
must in part have imposed the cover imagery and imaginations. The
point is that to an impressive though certainly not over extensive degree,
Yoshino embodies and enacts what he argues. The book does not, as
a matter of style or aesthetic genre, cover so much as it flaunts. Here
a lawyer, a scholar in charge of ‘intellectual life’ at Yale Law School,
a jurist, addresses poetry and portraiture, sleepless nights, anxious
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reveries, dark off-hours, phantasms, in a work that is also a tract on
civil rights, normative arguments and legal cases. It is precisely in this
mixture of modes, this mediation, that he uncovers, expresses and, so
be it, mirabile dictu, he flaunts.

Lastly, third point, envoi in the trinity, the question of the uncovered
itself, the matter of the wounds revealed, the tears shed. A certain
caution is necessary. As Bury puts it in his amorous address to books
all those years ago, and yet the lesson is perhaps not entirely absorbed:
there must be a most mature decorum in the opening and closing of
volumes, that they may neither be unclasped with precipitous haste,
nor thrown aside after inspection without being duly closed; for it is
necessary that a book should be much more carefully preserved than
a shoe (Bury 1345/1832: 71).

Exactly so. The cover, as Burton reminded us, is there for a purpose. So
too I imagine, and by extension, the person and persona or contemporary
mask deserve a similar caritas, this same decorum and love. Who
have we become? I dwelt at length upon the cover of Covering for the
very reason that the cover and clothes, what used to be termed the
‘lineaments of language’, namely elocution, should be examined as
carefully and cautiously as the face that utters the words. The apparently
commercial representation of the book, with its colours and blurbs,
image and title, belong within a genre that interfaces very directly
with the normative argument that the book endeavours to make at
multiple levels. The cover covers, it expresses, it hides, it is somewhat
enigmatic, a little cryptic, a touch hyperbolic, and yet also revealing and
indicative in showing the body, the partially covered and coloured face
of the author. The visage as vestige, the face as damage, the subject of
time’s harrow. The cover of the book indeed marks, it veils and reveals,
seduces and abandons, flirts and flaunts, which leads to the question of
the cover as a wound, a scar that marks the imposition of the institution
and the demands of the publisher.

375

Goodrich

Conclusion
How does the book end? Entry for content, exit for style. Nor can we
assume the juristic priority of the former over the latter. Quite the
contrary. Last things are end states, goals, achievements. So, I came
to the epilogue. It starts with the poem ‘Blue Star’ by Philip Levine.
‘Show me the place,’ it begins, where a tiny blue star nestles above the
heart. The star is unusual. It is examined by doctors. Surgery follows.
The star is removed but under it we find ‘another perfect star’. ‘What
does it mean?’, this star that will not be excised, that replicates, that
forms an indelible tattoo. The answer is as indexical and complex as
the pronoun ‘you’. Last line, ending and opening: ‘It could mean this
is who you are’ (Yoshino 2006: 198).
The star transpires to be permanent. It is part of the human carapace,
it is in the skin, part of the last and irreducible cover. So don’t cut the
star away, don’t erase or mutilate the cover, respect the astral as sign,
as face, as real. Professor Yoshino discusses the poem as an emblem
of a particular relationship, as a marker of ambivalent passion, as
hope against hope, and then shifts to reminisce about the wedding of
a friend. She has a tattoo of a blue star at the tip of her left shoulder
blade. He can see it now, above the wedding gown. In times past, as
a graduate student, Kenji had fought her over the tattoo. It was in his
view too indelible. Its unnecessary permanence bound her future to
a younger and impermanent self. But it is still there on her wedding
day, a beacon to her commitment to poetry, to writing and to writing
on the body. Yoshino looks back on those youthful enthusiasms, that
formative argument, and admits that he was wrong. Last words, closing
of the book, exit for style: ‘I still dislike tattoos. Except for this one,
which I love out of mind.’ Closing words, final remark, exeunt omnes.
To which, for completion, and to get back to the cover, the reference
to time out of mind is of course to common law, to time immemorial,
beyond memory of man, out of mind. A lovely notion, little understood,
and full of poetic significances. Here Yoshino takes it up and makes it
literature, turns a little piece of argot, a maxim of law, into lyric.14 That
is the promise and the gift produced by challenging demands to cover.
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As for me, the eccentric white commentator, the Anglican critic,
the covered male, I put the book down, last words at the end of a long
process of slow reading and my eyes welled with tears. I became a
woman. Others have said the same, but privately. Generally they were
women. So I will simply confess that law books have not on the whole
touched me to tears. It was a surprise, an engagement, a moment of
attachment, reflected no doubt also in my tendency occasionally to drift
into sleep, to revert to dreaming, while reading. I was moved, the poetry
bent me, it touched what might be termed my melancholic body. To
borrow from Tertullian, I became gently morose. This has a juridical
significance that can be traced initially to theological dogma and the
rules that governed weeping. Christian doctrine prohibited tears.
That expression of emotion was to be covered. Thus for Tertullian, for
example, author of De Spectaculis, to laugh and to weep, both sources of
tears, were alike impermissible in Christian worship. His text is an early
condemnation of theatre, games, spectacles and ‘public shows’ more
generally (Tertullian 1869 edn). Laughter, jesting, tears and dance were
all deemed excessive in a religious tradition that demanded silent, and
above all, serious worship, both quietude of the body and composure of
the mind. The Church Fathers thus distinguished between actual and
mystical tears and ordained that all weeping should be internal, that
tears should be swallowed, covered over and turned into prayer. The
Decretals, to take another key example, declares that ‘To weep for the
dead originates in meanness’ and subsequent edicts banned weeping
women from funerals for that reason.15 Tears collapse the face and,
to use a more contemporary and here topical idiom, they blow your
cover. They release. They leak. They shift the interior to the exterior.
Christianity refuses to let go of what is lost, it will not mourn, and
in refusing to mourn remains in a state of melancholia, attentive and
morose, waiting for the advent of another and better life (Allestree
1671). Hence the catharsis of tears and the benefit, the excitement and
the transformation generated by reading the book. Covering, for me, did
something that even Nietzsche deemed pretty much impossible. It was
a book that did not lead directly to more books but rather led to tears.
Tears, within the doctrinal tradition inherited by law, are contrasted
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to the purity of stoic dry eyes, and hence they are excessive, feminine,
emotional and altogether too contagious and vivid. Theologically they
suggest pagan passions, excess and enthusiasm, the latter being a term
derived from the Greek for possession by a God, religious frenzy, and
so illicit communion with the spirit world.16 In sum, tears flaunt the
fact of having covered, they expose the very moment of hiding the
undesired identity and so offer the opportunity of bringing the alternate
self to presence. Public tears enact a rite of commemoration, they are
an instance of shedding, of displaying in an irreducibly physical and
ambivalently fluid form a sense of loss that both galvanizes the face
that weeps and offers a species of illocutionary act.

We have to believe that tears are not wasted. They are in and of the
body, a property, a mark, a sign of the affect of presence and meaning.
They have a place and function, a role in the ceremony of release, as
also in the rite of interpretation. In positive terms I thus mourned a
loss, I let go of a tear, I loosed a shard of memory. Here is a secret, a
connection I finally made between Kenji’s trauma and my own tears.
It took me back to childhood and to my struggle to avoid returning to
boarding school at the age of eleven. I feigned stomach ache and ended
up having my appendix removed. The institution claimed an organ,
although it also claimed, and this was back in the excision happy sixties,
that the organ was not a necessary one. Now, years on, the story of the
star and its removal dislodged a memory of my institutional trauma and
my own scar, a thin line of skin that cannot feel, and which over forty
years on I still carry. It is a mark, branded on my flesh, an indelible
part of my cover, my carapace. An originary writing, an incision, a
wound. And so the tear. I flaunted to myself and now more obviously
to the world. In doing so, in repeating the experience in prose, I have
uncovered a fragment of identity that would not normally be in view.
In theory I should repress the memory, talk about something else, act
a bit more like a jurist than a child, a weeper. There is a doctrine of
tears that precisely dictates their repression, an epistemic of weeping
that views crying as weakness or excess, as feminine and dissolute. In
scholarly jargon, tears are external to juristic cognition and irrelevant to
a critical reading of a normative text, however decorously and carefully
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one seeks to treat it, however hidden in the conclusion the tears may be.

Returning to my epigraph and the wit and wisdom of Giacomo
Casanova, flâneur and flauntër par excellence, this essay has evidenced
the pervasiveness of covering and the desire to flaunt that lurks,
repressed or just occasionally, in legal contexts, expressed by poets such
as Yoshino and satirists such as I. Flaunting, to be juridically admissible,
must be acclamatory and institutional, a choral function of selling the
legal life, the way of the institution, the path of the covered soul. From
publisher’s marketing departments to Law School Public Relations
offices, institutional advancement and fundraising literature, there is a
well-developed science of glossy brochures, satisfied smiles and all those
other pretty signs — the contemporary inundation of photos, postcards,
visual announcements, invitations, magazines, letters both actual and
virtual. We have to learn to read these critically, along with all the
other juridical and judicial symbols whose unwitting use might cause
compromise of role and self. Covering makes a remarkable introduction
to this process of aesthetic and affective apprehension of legality writ
large and small, portrayed in the portraits on the classroom wall, the
magazines in the mailboxes and the other more formal stagings of
scholastic ceremony. Amidst all this glory, Yoshino traces the wounds,
the imposed roles, the compromises against which Casanova had so
lightly warned. What Kenji expresses is an intense and very acute
sense of the intimate laws of the institution, the training in manners
and examinations, in self-presentation and scholarly style, that are as
much a part of what is learned at school, in the process of becoming
a follower, a lawyer, as the explicit rules contained within the blank
and imageless boards of the casebooks, hornbooks and treatises. The
discipline also disciplines and that is peculiarly true of law.

Whatever the occasion of initiation, however, the lawbook will
equally run the gauntlet between tears and laughter, frustration and
insight, love and hate. For Casanova, the purpose of the history of his
life, the intimate narrative of a public trajectory, was to amuse and
bring laughter. On the inverse, Nemo laeditur nisi a seipso — we are the
artisans of our own sorrows. This is the classical, emblematic choice, the
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confrontation of Heraclitus and Democritus, their opposition and their
enfolding, their antinomic jointure. Uncovering, the choice elaborated
by Yoshino, the path traversed in this essay, is in the end a matter of
mingling, of the flux between two species of tears, those of sorrow and
laughter, memory and hope, lachrymae iuris and hilaritas, the latter
representing a more dialogic and somewhat dissonant interior law. In
Yoshino’s epilogue, it is a symbol on the body, a mark in the mode of a
tattoo that best represents this hilaritas. It frightened Kenji or at least
invoked his youthful disapproval. But now, years on, a professor of law,
the star on the back, and the poem about its permanence, duration and
enfolding of youth in age, becomes his envoi. A book can have images
on its cover, and a body can have figures, colours — symbola heroica —
on its skin. These are in the end unavoidable incidents of being in the
market, of living in a body. They are, in Casanova’s terms, expressions
of the uncompromised role, moments of authentic theatre in which the
self plays out its own part, its phantasm, its proper mask. By the same
token, a legal text has images enfolded in its prose, poetry mingled
with its rules, meaning and rhyme mixed with method and rhythm.

Notes
1

2

3

Thanks diversely and severally to Joe Brooker, Marianne Constable, Simon
Critchley, Anselm Haverkamp, Bill MacNeil, Mark Sanders, Kevin Stack,
Julie Suk, Chuck Yablon, Peter Rush, and Kenji Yoshino variously for
ideas, comments, opportunities, suggestions, and for silence when there
was nothing to say. Especial thanks to Linda Mills for her inimitable carte
de tendre.
Selden (1610) has a woodcut of Janus on the title page. The translation
of the book in Selden (1683), also uses this image on the title page. The
motto is Haec facies Populum spectat; at illa larum, which picks up on the
treatment of Janus in the legal emblem books of that century which treat
the deity as guardian of the law, looking inside and out, at the oeconomic
and the providential.
The image of Janus is used, for example, on the cover of Goodrich (1995).
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4

5
6
7

8

9

My thanks to Thanos Zartaloudis for originally pointing this out to me and
for discussing its significance. In fact, for the sake of precision, it will here
be noted that there are a few solitary figures in the city: a soldier guards
the castle wall, some other soldiers are marching in the main square, but
they are alone, the city is empty, they are guarding an idea. For additional
discussion, see Lawler (2009).
As, for example, Hobbes (1968) edited by C B Macpherson and published
by Penguin.

Classification and shelving of files and books is also a subject that lacks
much analysis. Cornelia Vismann (2007) makes a start in filling that gap.
One of the readers for Law Text Culture politely suggested that the
reference to ‘gay science’ be explained so as not to seem to flaunt an
adverse connotation. The reference is Rabelesian and to the gay scientist
‘sans culottes’, an anarchistic and amorous figure, discussed in the fondly
admired but little noted P Goodrich (2006).

The maxim, meaning the face is the index of the soul, is standard. See
Richard Head (1675). He continues: ‘The face is the index of the mind; yet
experience tells us it is no infallible indicium of the nature or disposition
of the person … [for] always to see, is not to know’.
The reference to erudition in eroticis is to Friedrich Neitzsche (1916) at
53.

10 Richard de Bury (1345/1832: 18) notes that ‘if anything whatever,
according to a degree of value deserves a degree of love’ then it is the
ineffable value of books that fills that role as object of desire. Much later,
Emanuel Levinas (1969: 254) notes that ‘a thing, an abstraction, a book
can likewise be objects of love’.
11 Pierre Legendre (1982: 46). For commentary, see Stephanie Lysyk (2006).
12 Richard de Bury (1345/1832: 56-7)

13 These issues can be pursued further in Luce Irigary (1995). For discussion
of this and other themes, see P Goodrich (1993:43).

14 The maxim is given, for example, in Sir Edward Coke (1629: 115a): Longum
tempus et longus usus, qui excedit memoriam hominum, sufficit pro jure [Long
time and long use, which exceeds the memory of men, is sufficient in law].
15 Decretals rubric of canon 26, cause 13, question 2.
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16 The best discussion of this dimension of the doctrine of tears can be found
in Edward Stillingfleete (1662) who lists seriousness in all matters of
worship as the third law of nature covering all manner of government.
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